Nash bargaining solution as negotiation concept for resource allocation problem: analysis of experimental data by Korgin, Nikolay A. & Korepanov, Vsevolod O.
Contributions to Game Theory and Management, XIII, 207217
Nash Bargaining Solution as Negotiation Conept for
Resoure Alloation Problem: Analysis of Experimental
Data
⋆
Nikolay A. Korgin and Vsevolod O. Korepanov
V.A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sienes of Russian Aademy of Sienes
Profsoyuznaya st. 65, Mosow, 117997, Russian Federation
E-mail: nkorginipu.ru, vkorepanovipu.ru
Abstrat Motivated by researh works on Zeuthen-Hiks bargaining, whih
leads to the Nash bargaining solution (Vetshera, 2018), we analyze data ob-
tained during experimental resoure alloation gaming with Yang-Hajek's
mehanism from the lass of proportional alloation mehanisms. Games
were designed in the form of negotiation to allow players to reah onsen-
sus. Behavior models based on best response, onstant behavior, and Nash
bargaining solution are dened. Analysis onduted over deisions made by
partiipants shows that a signiant share of all deisions leads to an inrease
of Nash bargaining value. It is even higher than the share of deisions that
are in agreement with the best-response onept. Consensus-ended games
show more but subtle attration to Nash bargaining solution behavior. We
disuss how these deisions orrespond with other types of behavior atively
exhibited by partiipants of this experiments  so-alled onstant behavior
and with the end of negotiation proess in games.
Keywords: resoure alloation mehanisms, Nash implementation, Nash
bargaining solution.
1. Introdution
Motivated by researh works on Zeuthen-Hiks bargaining, whih leads to the
Nash bargaining solution (Harsanyi, 1956); Vetshera, 2018), we analyze data ob-
tained during experimental gaming omparison of resoure alloation rules in ase of
transferable utilities desribed in (Korgin and Korepanov, 2017). In that researh,
several mehanisms were ompared in setting with quasi-linear utilities: a meha-
nism (YH) from the lass of proportional alloation mehanisms (Yang and Hajek,
2005; Basar and Maheswaran, 2003), a mehanism (GL) with balaned payments
using the Groves-Ledyard rule (Groves and Ledyard, 1977) that gives the eient
solution of the problem as a Nash equilibrium in the players' game introdued in
(Korgin, 2016), as well as its modiation (GLR) reduing the dimension of the
ation spae of the players (Korgin, 2016) and a mehanism based on distributed
optimization algorithm (ADMM) problem (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004).
We analyze deisions made by partiipants in games with YH mehanism. We
show that a signiant share of all deisions leads to an inrease of Nash bargaining
value, and it is even higher than the share of deisions that are in agreement with
the best-response onept.
We disuss how these deisions orrespond with other types of behavior atively
exhibited by partiipants of these experiments  so-alled onstant behavior and
with the end of negotiation proess in games.
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2. Resoure Alloation Problem
An organizational system onsists of a single Prinipal and a set N = {1, . . . , n}
of players. Prinipal disposes of some innitely divisible good in a limited amount
R ∈ R1 and allots it among the players in any proportion.
The utility of eah player i ∈ N in terms of the good xi ∈ [0, R] allotted to
him is desribed by a funtion ui(•) : R1 → R1 belonging to a ertain set Ui of
admissible utility funtions.
The set of admissible alloations is
A = {x = (x1, ..., xn) :
∑
i∈N
xi ≤ R, x ∈ Rn+}, (1)
the set of possible utility proles is
U = {u = (u1(•), . . . , un(•)) : ui(•) ∈ Ui, i ∈ N}. (2)
The problem is to nd suh an alloation mapping g(•) : U → A that is eient
in the sense that it maximizes the total utility of all players for any utility prole







We onsider model N = {1, 2, 3} with utility funtions ui(xi) =
√
ri + xi, where
r = (1, 9, 25) - prole of "initial endowment" of players or, generally, types of utility
funtions. Type ri of a player i is private information and generally not known to
the Prinipal. Amount of disposable resoure is R = 115.
An eient alloation aordingly to the right part of (3) is alloation when sum
of utilities attain maximum value. For our model, eient alloation and prot of
eah player:
xeff = (49, 41, 25) (4)
ueff = u1(x
eff
1 ) = u3(x
eff
3 ) = u3(x
eff
3 ) ≈ 7.07 (5)
3.1. Inentive Inompatibility
For ommon ase of types r the eient alloation is determined aording to:
xi = (R +
∑
i∈N
ri)/n− ri, i ∈ N. (6)
Obviously, being answered about ri any player strives for underrating the value
of this parameter (to inrease his utility) instead of truth-telling . Thus, eah player
i answer ri = 1, eient alloation will be x
∗ ≈ (38.3, 38.3, 38.3), but total utility
with real players' types will be less than optimal sine x∗ 6= xeff .
So we have the inentive inompatibility problem.
3.2. Game Proess Model and Experimental Data
The Game proess is implemented in the form of an iterative proess as follows.
At eah iteration (step), n bids (one bid from eah player) are aquired and pro-
essed aording to the rules of the Yang-Hajek resoure alloation mehanism (see
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appendix 1). The result of its operation is reported to all players. At the next step,
any player may vary his bid, possibly aeting the result. The game proess stops if
none of the players varies his bid ("stop rule"), or the proess reahes a maximum
admissible step T known to all players. Parameter T was dierent in some game
sessions: 60, 20, or 15. The payo of eah player is dened as the prot at the last
step.
The last step is ruial beause players reeive payos aording to the YH
mehanism on the last step. At the same time, the "stop rule" (none of the players
varies his bid) allows players to reah an agreement.
The partiipants of experiments were Russian students of several State Univer-
sities of Mosow, Perm, Samara ities from faulties of Tehnology or Eonomis.
Partiipants of one session studied the game rules and play in learning games, and
then they were randomly alloated in groups of three and play nal (test) games.
We treat the results of eah group as one separate game.
Notations: at eah step t players make bids s1(t), s2(t), s3(t) - bids of the rst,
seond and third player aordingly. The situation at step t is the tuple s(t) =
(s1(t), s2(t), s3(t)). Then, in aordane with the YH mehanism, they reeive re-
soures x(s(t)), give transfers τ(s(t)) and their prots are φ(s(t)) = u(x(s(t)) −
τ(s(t)).
As experiments results, we have data of 13 games, 13 sets of start-to-end sit-
uations {(s1(1), s2(1), s3(1)), ..., (s1(teg), s2(teg), s3(teg))}, where teg is the end step of
game g ∈ {1, ..., 13}. Of ourse, in addition to situations, we also have derived data:
given resoures, transfers, and prots in aordane with the YH mehanism.
4. The Main Approah: Nash Bargaining Solution
We an treat the game proess as a negotiation proess among players: they
bargain their prots. If they have reahed a satisfatory result, they do not have
a desire to hange anything and therefore, will not hange bids, and the game will
stop by the "stop rule".
4.1. The Zeuthen-Hiks Bargaining Model
Initial Zeuthen-Hiks bargaining model onsiders the interation between two
parties - seller and buyer (Harsanyi, 1956; Vetshera, 2018).
The model onsiders negotiations between two parties 1 and 2. Denote an arbi-
trary party as i ∈ N = {1, 2}, and i's opponent by (−i). The urrent oer of party
i is xi.
The utility funtion of party i is ui(x). At eah step, party i has to deide
whether to aept the oer x−i of the opponent or insist on its own oer xi, whih
an be aepted or rejeted by the opponent. Rejetion by the opponent leads to
termination of the negotiation. In that ase, eah party reeives a disagreement
utility of di.
The probability that opponent will rejet oer xi is denoted by p−i. Party i will
aept the opponent's oer if
ui(x−i) > p−iui(di) + (1− p−i)ui(xi). (7)
It's supposed that hold
ui(di) < ui(x−i) ≤ ui(xi). (8)
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From (7), one an determine a ritial probability p∗−i at whih party i is indif-





If p−i > p
∗
−i, it is better for i to aept the opponent's oer rather than insist
on xi. Therefore, p
∗
−i an be onsidered as a measure of the strength of party i in
the urrent state (xi, x−i) of the negotiation. The weaker party will then make a
onession. Thus party i makes a onession if p∗−i < p
∗
i whih after substitution
(9) is equivalent to
(ui(xi)−ui(di))(u−i(xi)−u−i(d−i)) < (ui(x−i)−ui(di))(u−i(x−i)−u−i(d−i)). (10)
Therefore, the urrently weaker party will make a onession to revert the in-
equality sign in (10) and thus has an inentive to inrease the value of the Nash
bargaining objetive funtion
U(x) = (ui(x)− ui(di)) · (u−i(x) − u−i(d−i)) (11)
the maximum of whih is the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950).
4.2. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)
In ase of three players it is not possible to treat negotiation as Zeuthen-Hiks







where d = (0, 0, 0) with u(d) = (1, 3, 5), i.e. disagreement utility is base utility
without transfers pi = 0 and resoures xi = 0.
Due to YH mehanism, we use a prot φ of players instead of their utilities.
Value of UNash(s, d) in a onrete situation we will all "NBS value" for simpliity.
Another way to hek signiane of NBS to players is "loal NBS" version:
UNashloc (s, t) =
3∏
i=1
(φi(s)− φi(s(t− 1)) −−−→
x∈A
max. (13)
In our onrete ase, UNash(s, d) and moreover UNashloc (s, t) an be positive if
two of three multipliers in (12) and (13) are negative. Therefore we use shifted
objetive funtions:






· |UNash(s, d)| (14)






· |UNashloc (s, t)|. (15)
The (14) and (15) funtions are positive only if all multipliers (12) and (13) are
positive. Additionally, for loal NBS it means that player's prots have inreased
at step t.
Now let us proeed to the desription of our approah to behavior analysis.
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5. Behavior Models
We estimate the shares of deisions made by players that orrespond to some
behavior models and the shares of situations when some or all players made deisions
that orrespond to some behavior models.
Let's denote c  the ount of all individual bids in our data, C  the ount of
all situations. For our 3-player games onsidered c = 3C. Then the share of some
behavior 'B' is #{si(t)|si(t) ∈ B}/c and the share of some set of situations 'P ' is
#{s(t)|s(t) ∈ P}/C.
Now let us proeed to the desription of the behavior models under onsidera-
tion.
Nash bargaining behavior
 Firstly we onsider deisions that go into diretion of NBS inrease, indepen-
dently of whether the move is suiently large. We treat si(t) to be Nash-
inreasing (NI) deision if:
U(si(t), d) > U(s(t− 1), d), i ∈ N, (16)
where si(t) = (si(t), s−i(t− 1)) and d = (0, 0, 0):
 Further we an dene Real Nash inreasing (Real NI) situations. We treat s(t)
to be Real Nash-inreasing situation if it did inrease the NBS value at step t :
U(s(t), d) > U(s(t− 1), d). (17)
 Similarly instead of NBS we an use loal NBS. We treat si(t) to be loal Nash-
inreasing (LNI) deision if:
Uloc(s
i(t), t) > 0, (18)
 and we treat s(t) to be Real loal Nash-inreasing (Real LNI) situation if:
Uloc(s(t), t) > 0. (19)
Rational behavior All rational behavior models are based on the best response
(BR) of a player to a situation on the previous step:
bri(s(t− 1)) = argmax
y∈R+
φi(yi, s−i(t− 1)). (20)
Let's onsider two rational behavior models.
 We treat si(t) to be near best response with auray ε (BR(ε)) if:
|si(t)− bri(s(t− 1))| < ε
 We treat si(t) to be Toward BR (TBR) if:
{





bri(s(t− 1))− si(t− 1)
)
> 0, otherwise.
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Constant behavior We treat some sequene of bids of one player i from step ts
to step te > ts with auray ε to be onstant behavior CB(i, ts, te, ε) if:
1. |si(ts, te)| ≤ ε
2. ∀a < ts, b > te : |si(a, te)| > ε ∧ |si(ts, b)| > ε
3. Not exists another CB(i, t′s, t
′
e, ε) suh that t
′
s < ts and ts < t
′
e < te.
The above items desribe mathematially results of the algorithm of the se-
quential searh for unhanged bids (with some auray ε): starting from the rst
step, we are looking for the bids sequene of players whose maximum and minimum
dier by no more than ε.
The set of all CB with auray ε is denoted as CB(ε).
 We treat si(t) to be Agree CB (ACB) if a player doesn't hange his deision at
all - signal that he is agree with alloation:
si(t) = si(t− 1)
 We treat si(t) to be Waiting CB (WCB) if a player slightly hanges his deision
in order not to stop negotiation proess:
WCB(ε) = CB(ε) \ACB
 We treat si(t) to be Rational WCB(RWCB) if a player perform WCB toward
his BR:
RWCB(ε) =WCB(ε) ∩ TBR
6. Results
6.1. Individual Deisions in YH Games
In the table below (see gure 1), the numbers and shares of individual deisions
that orrespond to behavior models desribed above are presented. In the left and
right parts of the table are depited results about all games, and games ended
with onsensus. We have only three onsensus-ended games, but they ontain 56
situations (31, 19, and 6) with 168 individual deisions. Rows with ouple behavior
models, separated by \(for example - LNI\NI), orrespond to deisions that suit a
rst behavior model but not to a seond one.
The most observed models in all games are TBR, Agree CB, and Nash inreasing.
The data of games with onsensus is similar to all games, but there is an exeptions:
1. Loal Nash inreasing models are found twie more often, and all suh deisions
are rational,
2. Nash inreasing models without CB have grown,
3. less Waiting and Rational Waiting CB deisions,
4. BR(1) is doubled from 5% to 10%, but TBR does not hange.
So most observed models in all games and onsensus-ended games are almost
equivalent, but other models are hanged. In onsensus-ended games, players exhibit
more intention to at aordingly to loal NBS, i.e., to inrease utility of all players.
It seems that non-Agree CBs our signiantly rare. Item 4 maybe shows that
TBR deisions in onsensus games are more onentrated near BR with auray 1
than in all games.
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Fig. 1. Individual deisions in all YH games and in onsensus-ended YH games.
6.2. Deision Situations
In the previous setion, we see at bids of players and their intention toward
BR and NI, but to see at dynami of negotiation proess we an see at situations
- behavior of player's group altogether s = (s1, s2, s3). We onsider two types of
situations: when all players at aording to the same behavior model and when at
least one player ats aording to it.
In gure 2 Rational and Constant behavior models are presented. Games with
onsensus have most dierenes again with less Waiting CB behaviors. Most ob-
served "at least one TBR" and "at least one Agree CB" again do not have signif-
iant hanges. "At least One BR(1)" again has more perent in onsensus games
(almost three times), but TBR situations do not hange.
In gure 3 NBS models in situations are onsidered. Real inrease of Nash fun-
tion relates to 'All ...' models and has the most observable ases in the lass. It
turns out that about half of situations did inrease Nash value! Count of real Nash
inreasing situations with at least one player toward Nash inreasing equal to 155,
with at least two players equal to 67.
So real Nash inreasing also our in 88 (155-67) situations when only one of
players makes deision toward Nash inreasing. Maybe other players do not hange
their bids (remember Agree CB is 30% of individual deisions), but it is an inter-
esting question about what other situations an real inrease Nash funtion.
Conerning dierenes with onsensus games, again (as with individual dei-
sions), we see doubled ount of situations with observed Loal NI models. So when
onsidering situations, we see that players who demonstrate wish to inrease loal
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Fig. 2. Deision situations in all YH games and in onsensus-ended YH games.
Nash funtion (i.e., utilities) ame to an agreement. Alternatively, onsensus-ended
games have more players who demonstrate wish to inrease utilities.
In gure 4 ount of steps until the end of games from the last observed model
are presented.
In games with onsensus, we see fewer values on average ompared to timeout-
ended games. 'All ...' deisions rare belongs to the seond half of game length, but
'One ...', Real NI, and Real LNI situations are near the end of game, espeially to
onsensus games. This data tells us that in onsensus games last of NBS behavior
observed lose to end. It an be treated as NBS triggers the end of negotiation
proess. Interestingly, some short games with T ≤ 20 do not have situations 'All
NI' and 'All LNI', unlike games with T = 60 or onsensus.
An example of negotiation proess for one game ended with onsensus is pre-
sented in gure 5. At steps 2 and 5 individual deisions and situations are NBS
Fig. 3. Deision situations in YH games, NBS models.
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Fig. 4. NBS and end of games.
agree, or as at step 5, two players make LNI bids, and one does not hange bid
at this step and further, signaling about satisfation. May be players at oopera-
tively, and these harateristis of situations at steps 2 and 5 may be indiators of
ooperative behavior.
7. Conlusion
The researh onduted allows us to onlude that indiators based on Nash
bargaining value do allow us to predit possibilities for negotiation parties to reah
a onsensus.
The initial design of experiments under onsideration was not intended to iden-
tify if some partiipants behave toward Nash Bargaining Solution. Analysis of data
shows us some evidene that a signiant part of deisions and situations suit be-
havior that leads to an inrease of NBS value as opposed to best response behavior.
Nevertheless, there was no evidene found that inrease of some "global" NBS value
may be somehow onneted with the possibility to reah the onsensus. However,
swithing attention to a loal inrease of NBS in the style of (Vetshera, 2018) turns
out to be fruitful.
In ases when parties reahed an agreement, all partiipants of suh games took
more deisions to inrease loal Nash Bargaining value. Furthermore, the last sit-
uations of real Nash funtion inreasing were enountered almost at the end of
games.
Fig. 5. Negotiation example.
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At the same time, it should be pointed out that suh loal inrement of Nash
Bargaining funtion while ahieving some onsensus may be quite far from Nash
Bargaining Solution. However, taking in to aount the fat that partiular NBS
depends on seletion of disagreement solution, while loal inrease of Nash Bargain-
ing funtion as it is dened here and in (Vetshera, 2018) depends only on situation
at previous iteration of bargaining proess.
The perspetives of the further diretions of researh following the approah
desribed in this paper may be suggested. The rst obvious diretion is to extend
the analysis onduted on data from experimental games with other mehanisms
desribed in (Korgin and Korepanov, 2017). The main diulty is to dene NBS
behavior with multidimensional signals, like in GL mehanism. The next diretion
is onneted with the onept of reexion or strategi thinking (Chkartishvili and
Korepanov, 2016) - if the knowledge about Nash funtion and NBS will aet the
deision-making proess of parties during negotiation or not. Finally, redesign of
experiment to identify if partiipants think about something in ommon with Nash
Bargaining value should be onduted to verify all the hypotheses developed through
previous stages.
Appendix
1. Yang-Hajek's proportional mehanism
The Yang-Hajek's lass of mehanisms (Yang and Hajek, 2005) is one of the
lasses of resoure alloation mehanisms developed to deal with the inentive in-
ompatibility. In our researh we used a mehanism from this lass with the following
parameters.
Ation of eah player - amount of resoure she would like to reeive - bid si ∈ R+.
All players gives their bids s = (s1, s2, s3). Denote S =
∑
j sj .
Resoure that will be given to player i is equal to xi = R ∗ si/S. Transfer of
player τi = β si (S − si), where β = 0.0005 - penalty stritness.
And player's prot is φi = ui(xi)− τi.
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